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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of HERBERT DURANT EDNEY, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-10-ST1 136 Index Nu. 59-10 
Appearances : Herbert Durant Edney 
Inmate No. 74-A- 1456 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Fishkill Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 307 
Beacon, NY 12508 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
(Justin C. Levin, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
Albciliy, NCLV Y0i-k 12224 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Fishkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March 24,2009 
to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. This was his tenth appearance before the 
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Parole Board. 
In 1974 the petitioner was convicted (after trial) ofthe following crimes: manslaughter 
first degree, kidnaping second degree. and kidnaping first degree. On May 3, 1975 the 
petitioner was sentenced to the following concurrent terms G f  imprisonment: manslaughter 
first degree, 0 to 25 years; kidnaping second degree, 0 to 25 years; kidnaping first degree, 
25 years to life. Among the many arguments set forth in the pctition, petitioner points out that he 
is now eighty years of age, and has been incarcerated since he wm age thirty-nine. He indicates that 
during his incarceration he has been employed in various jobs. and has been granted a number of 
certificates and diplomas for successful programing. Accordiag to the petitioner, his health has 
deteriorated during his imprisonment. He has been diagnosed with prostate cancer, a leaking heart 
valve, poor kidney function and pre-cancerous lesions of the esophagus. The petitioner argues that 
the determination to deny release is irrational by reason that the Parole Board improperly mentioned 
the manslaughter conviction in its decision, which he contends was inappropriate by reason that his 
sentence on that charge has been fully served,’ He maintains thzt the Parole Board failed to consider 
the proper statutory factors under Executive Law 9 2594, including his good disciplinary record, 
academic and therapeutic accomplishments, programing, family support and an offer of employment. 
In his view, the Parole Board improperly relied solely upon the seriousness of the crimes for which 
he was convicted. The petitioner argues that the Parole Board, by ripeatedly denying parole release 
has, in effect, altered his sentence. He also maintains that his constitutional right to equal protection 
of the law has been violated, citing examples of fellow inmates who were convicted of multiple 
homicides, but have since been released to parole. The petitioner objects to certain special 
‘Ths pclitioiicr also advances an argument that becausc the concurrent sentences merged 
under the provisions of Penal Law 0 70.30, the manslaughter sentence “was never being served”. 
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conditions which have been recommended by the facility parole officer which he claims relate to sex 
offenders. Lastly, the petitioner maintains that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous factual 
information concerning his criminal record. Specifically, he asserts that the inmate status report 
contains a reference to his arrest in 1968 on the kidnaping and homicide charges. He indicates that 
the inmate status report incorrectly states that the kidnaping involved a demand for ransom. 
Turning first to a threshold issue, the petitioner maintains that respondent’s answer, served 
on March 12,201 0, was untimely. The Court observes that under CPLR 7804 (c) answering papers 
must be served at least five days before the return date. In this instance, the return date was Friday, 
March 19,20 10. Inasmuch as respondent’s papers were served seven days prior to the return date, 
the Court finds that respondent’s answer and supporting papers were timely and may be considered.. 
Turning to the merits, the reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny 
petitioner release on parole are set forth as follows: 
“ Parole is denied. After careful review of your record, personal 
interview and due deliberation, it is the determination of this 
Panel that if released at this time there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live at liberty without violating 
the law. Release at this time is incompatible with the welfare 
and safety of the community and would so deprecate the 
seriousness of this crime as to undermine respect for the law. 
This decision is based upon the following factors: the serious 
nature of the instant offense of kidnaping 1 St. kidnaping 2d and 
manslaughter 1 st, wherein you took an eight-year-old girl’s life 
away by brutally and viciously stabbing her to death. You 
continue to lack remorse and minimize these offenses. This was 
a heinous crime, with a total disregard for the life of this 
defenseless human being. Your criminal history reflects a prior 
felony conviction, wherein you violated parole. It is noted that 
you have maintained a fair disciplinary record and have 
programmed well while serving the State sentence. Your letters 
of support have been considered. However considering all 
relevant factors, parole release is denied.’’ 
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As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; A1aucim uf Ldlaclu L h w  l-uih Ltate Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
20011). Ifthe Parole Board‘s decision is made in accordance with the staruiory i.crquiic:liic.iils, 
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
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New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision, and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of 
the parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon 
being released, which include relocating to Virginia to be with his sister. The petitioner was 
afforded ample opportunity during the parole interview to explain why he should be released. 
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial 
of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 
11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; 
Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). 
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the 
inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board 
of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 
1996), as well as the in1mte's criminal history (E Matte1 of Farid v Tiavis, 239 AD2d 629 
[3rd Dept., 19971; _Matt_er of Coben v Gonmlg,  254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see 
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor 
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (E Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AUJd 859 [3rd 
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Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to  
undermine respect for [the] law”’ \ l l ; i t i L h l -  ~ 1 ’  Ih i r ik+ \ Z.C-\~ 1 ’ 1 1 1  I, KIiilL‘ Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). Simply stated, the Parole Board properly considered the fact that the petitioner 
caused the death of his eight year old victim during the kidnaping for which he stands 
convicted and is still serving time. 
The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon 
the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 
AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rd Dept., 20083). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court 
set the minimum term of petitioner’s sentence (see M a t h  of Siliiivii v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 
476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 
8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
oi the hebraska Penal and Clorrectional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matki uf 1Cu~so v 
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New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, p u p - ) .  It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law 9 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 I6 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russa v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76, 
supra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
With respect to petitioner's equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable 
classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 45 1 US 648,68 
L Ed 2d 514, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [ 198 13). Where the action under review does not involve 
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is 
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal 
protection clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is 
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's 
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New 
York, 274 F3d 740,75 I [2"d Cir., 200 11). In addition, because "New York courts addnming 
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a state equal protection claim will ordinarily afford the same breadth of coverage conferred 
by federal courts under the US Constitution in the same or similar matters" (Brown v State 
of New York, 45 AD3d 15,20-21 [2007 [3rd Dept., 20071, quoting Brown v State of New 
York, 9 AD3d 23,27 [2004]), the Court discerns no violation of NY Const art 1 5 1 1.  The 
Court finds the argument to have no merit. 
The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (E Matter of Tatta v State 
ofNew York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604). 
With respect to the alleged factual error concerning the statement in the inmate status 
report that the kidnaping was for ransom, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to 
correct the error during the parole interview, which he in fact did. Nor is there any indication 
in the record that the determination was affected by an error of fact (see Matter of Restivo 
v New York State Board of Parole, 70 AD3d 1096 [3rd Dept., 20101; Matter of Morel v 
Travis, 278 AD2d 580 [3d Dept., 20001, appeal dismissed 96 NY2d 752 [2001]; Matter of 
Abascal v New York State Board of Parole, 23 AD3d 740, 741 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of 
Ponder v Alexander, So AU3d 848, 849 IJ Dept., 20081). 
The Court has reviewed and considered petitioner's remaining arguments and 
contentions and finds them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relatiiig to thcl 
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petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: April d/ ,2010 
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